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ASPECfS OF HEIDEGGER IN FRANCE
The present remarks are drawn from a work in progress that
seeks to elucidate the nature and significance of the French reception of
Heidegger's theory. My modest aim is to describe some aspects of
Heidegger's extraordinary rise to prominence in French philosophy since
the end of the Second World War. It is fair to say that in this period
Heidegger has become the central "French" philosopher, the master
thinker of contemporary French philosophy.
To begin \vith, a comparison with Kant's influence on the
immediately succeeding discussion will be useful. Although there were
some thinkers who were uninterested in the critical philosophyand others
who opposed it, for the most part Kant's theory dominated later, post-
Kantian German idealism: A similar situation now obtains in French
philosophy that to an often unrealized extent today mainly takes shape
within the horizon of Heidegger's thought.
The first thing to say is that the relation between Heidegger and
French philosophy has always been unequal. Heidegger was widely read
in and unusually aware of the history of philosphy. Over the last several
hundred years, and to a degree that is düficult to understand outside the
French discussion, Descartes has been the central figure in French
philosophy. Descartes' influence is still dominant in French even now.
It is, then, signigicant that in a critical discussion of Foucault's book,
Histoire de la folie, Derrida states that Foucault shows, more through his
monumental book than through his naive reading of Descartes, "a quel
point l'acte philosophique ne pouvait plus etre cartesien en son essence
ct en son projet, ne pouvant plus ne plus etre en memoire de cartesia-
nisme, si etre cartesien c'est, comme l'entendaitsans doute Descartes lui-
mcmc, vouloir etre cartesien"l
1 Jacques Derrida. L'ecrilure cl Ja difference. (Paris: Seuil, 1967): 95.
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Yet there is little evidence 0(, a positive influen~ of French
philosophy in Heidegger's theory and none as concerns Descartes'
position. To an almost unparalleled extent, Heidegger is an anti-
Cartcsian. Heidegger's single concern is the problem of being. He
consistently represents Descartes early and late as the author of a theory
representing the most developed form of a mistaken ontology arising on
the basis ofa turn away from the questionofbeing. In Beingand Time,
his initial and most importapt work, he launches a detailed attack on the
Cartesian theory that he later develops in other writings, above all in the
important lecture "Age of the World Picture."
Nonetheless, and despite his negative reaction to French
philosophy, Heidegger reached out toward French philosophy on two
occasions. In a text written in 1937, "Ways to Discussion" ["Wege zur
Ausprache"] after the period of his service as rector of the University of
Freiburg, as Germany and Europe were moving rapidly toward the
Second World War, Heidegger examines the conditions of agreement
between the French and the Germans. Here he states his view of
understanding among peoples in a description of the authenticity of a
people as following from its realization in a future historical context
before calling upon the French to do likewise. This little known text
received scant attention at the time and is not even included in the
edition of Heideggers Collected Works now in preparation, although it
is certainly significant for an appreciation of Heidegger's relation to
French philosophy2.
A decade later Heidegger addressed himself to the French in
another, extremely well-known text, the "Letter on Humanism:' written
in 1947 in response to an inquiry from Jean Beaufret. Here he reinter-
prctcd his early position through the conccpt of a turning in his thought.
This conccpt has two functions in this text. In the first place, it serves to
designate the normal evolution of his position, like any position that does
not merely stagnate. Second, as a letter to the French almost
immcdiatcly after the war it is meant to reassure French readers that
2 For a discussion of lhis text, see Tom Rockmore, On Heidegger's Nazism and
PhiJosophy. (Berkeley: Universily of California Press, 1992): 119-121.
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lhrough a turning in his thought he has stirred away from his leaning
toward National Socialism, including his membership in the Nazi party,
his service as rector to the University of Freiburg, and so on. Like other
Nazis, after the war Heidegger was called to account for his actions. On
the advice of Karl Jaspers, his friend, he was rusticated from the Univer-
sity. Since Freiburg was in the French occupation zone, in insisting in his
own way that he is a humanist, Heidegger the philosopher appeals
through his text to French philosophers and, beyond them, to the French
occupation authorities who temporarily drove hirn from the university.
Heidegger's theory was introduced into France in the late 20s
and early 30s before his Nazi turning. It only became widely influential
after the war. A major factor in the unusual receptivity of French phil-
osophyand culture to Heidegger's theory lies in the humanist aspect that
is a constant in French philosophy. We can distinguish two senses of
humanism, as concerns classical studies, or studia humanitatis, and the
theory of human being, what later led to the human sciences (les
sciences de l'homme). Jacob Burkhardt has shown that the idea of
human being was central to the Italian renaissance, for instance in
Petrarch's poetry. In philosophy, the science of man is a main theme in
the tlieories of Hume and Kant.
French thought, especially philosophy, has long centered on the
conception of human being. It was present in Rabelais, in the famous
letter to Pantagruel from Gargantua, his father. In philosophy, it is a
factor in Montaigne's Essais that concern hirnself as the subject in order
to emerge from scepticism. It is further developed in Descartes' theory,
beginning with the Traite de l homme, continuing in the Discours de la
methode, with its injunction, following Montaigne, to look into myself,
and the famous Meditations de philosophie premiere that were originally
to be titled "Projet d'une science universelle qui puisse elever notre
nature ason plus haut degre ,de perfection!' And it is still present in his
final text, "Les passions de l'äme." The same humanist theme that is later
restated in Condorcet's weil known Esquisse d'un tableau historique des
progres de lesprit humain runs throughout all later French thought.
Recent examples include Roger Garaudy's attempt in Perspeclives de
lhonlme: Existentialisme, pensee Catholique, structuralisme, marxisme
(Paris: Presses Universitaire de France, 1969) and Mikel Dufrenne's
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reaffirmation of human being in Pour lhomme (Paris: Seuil, 1968).
When speaking of humanism as a theory of human being, it is
natural to approach human being through some version of philosophical
anthropology. If French philosophy is basically humanist, it is hardly
surprising that the initial phase of the French Heidegger reception
provided an interpretation of Heidegger's theory as an anthropological
theory of human being. This view arose in the early discussions and
translations of his thought due to Koyre, Kojeve, Corbin, Gurvitch,
Uvinas, Wahl and others. In different ways, all of these writers were
inte(ested in Heidegger's theory from a humanist angle of vision solidly
anchored in philosophical anthropology.
Kojeve particularly did much to foster the early French humanist
reading of Heidegger through his famous lectures in the 1930s on Hegers
Phenomeno1ogyo[Spirillater published by Raymond Queneau as Inlro-
duction a1a 1ecture de 1a Phenomeno1ogyde lespril de Hegel. Kojeve,
who argued that Hegel's theory is a philosophical anthropology whetlter
or not he was aware of it, based his own reading of this book, on the
views of Marx and Heidegger. Yet a reading of Hegers Phenomeno1ogy
as a philosophical anthropology through the lens provided by the theories
of Marx and Heid~gger is possible only if these theories are also
philosophical anthropologies.
Kojeve further influenced Corbin's influential rendering of
Heidegger's term"Dasein," which literally means "existence," as "realite
humaine," a translation that Beaufret refused and Derrida later branded
as "monstrous." The initial anthropological reading of Heidegger's theory
as humanism reached its high point immediately after the war in Sartre's
popular lecture, nL'existentia1isme est un humanisme." In this difficult
period when Sartre's own humanism was in question, he defended himself
by saying in effect that his own view was a hunlanism in the same way as
Heidegger's.
The initial French reading ofHeidegger's theory as a traditionally
anthropological form of humanism is suggested by a number of internat
indications in paragrph 10 of Hcidcgger's Being and Time, including his
criticism of traditional humanism but not humanism, his insistence that
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human being is literally in the world and not transcendent to it, and his
approval of a wider theory of human being enconlpassing all human
aspects. Yet this reading runs counter to Heidegger's own explicit effort
in this same paragraph 10 to draw a clear distinction between his own
theory and all the sciences of man, including biology, psychology and
anthropology. Ifwe follow Heidegger's official view and bracket his other
indications, it is clearly an error to read his theory as a humanism in an
anthropological sense of the term.
The reaction to Sartre's identification of existentialism with
Heidegger's theory rapidly led to a new phase of the Heidegger reception
in which Heidegger's position, following his "Letter on Humanism," was
reinterpreted as a humanism of a different type. The new phase of the
Heidegger reception followed Heidegger's text in several ways to create
a new reading of Heidegger's theory as a nonanthropologicalhumanism.
In his text, Heidegger criticized Sartre's view for its uncritical repro-
duction of metaphysics, hence philosophy, while suggesting that his own
theory was located beyond metaphysics and, for that reason, beyond
philosophy. The new thinking that is to come, Heidegger insisted, lies
beyond theory and practire; it is no longer philosophy.
In his text, Heidegger devotes special attention to the idea of
humanism that he labels as metaphysical. His objection is directed to the
very idea ~f human being as understood through itself. The proper
approach to human being, he Imaintains, is in terms of being. He returns
in this way to the understanding of human being (Dasein) in terms of
being (Sein) first sketched in Being and Time. The resultant theory, he
insists, is still a humanism, although not in the traditional sense, since
human being is no longer understood in an anthropological but in a
nonanthropological perspective. Heidegger's nonanthropological
humanism is not metaphysical but postmetaphysical, occurring on a
further remove beyond the philosophical tradition.
The new reading of Heidegger's thought as nonanthopological
humanism, based on his "Letter on Humanism," agrees with the nonan-
thopological thrust of paragraph 10 of Being and Time where Heidegger
strove to distance his own theory from the various positive sciences. This
new reading is the fundamental text underlying the understanding of
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Heidegger's thought that still persists in French philosophy and that
continues to form the horizon of the contemporary French philosophical
discussion. This nonanthropologicalconception of the subject is doubly
influential in the French philosophical context. It is, to begin with,
reflected in the view of Heidegger's thought that in France has always
been understood through' the "Letter on Humanismn that is in large part
a letter to the French. That this text has been so influential is due to a
number of contingent facto~s, including its rapid translation into French
whereas it was necessary to wait more than half a century for t,he first
complete, but still unauthorized translation of Being and Time, and thc
important effort at prosclytizing undertakcn by Heidegger's Frcnch
students, particularly leaD Beaufret.
It is further influential in the rise of French structuralism. French
structuralism that emerged in the 1960s can be understood from two pers-
pectives, as arevolt against the domination of Sartre's theory, as French
thinkers sought to withdraw from the influence of a perhaps objectionable
French guru, and as a turn to Heidegger's later decentering of the sUbject
as he accentuated the nonanthropological, in fact antianthropological
direction of his thought. The celebrated French structuralist turn away
from human being, best known in Uvi-Strauss' structurat anthropology
and Foucault's idea of the death of man, is directly traceable to the
nonanthropologicalconception of sUbjectivity Heidegger advances in his
"Letter on Humanism" amd other tater writings.
The nonanthropological, humanist reading of his theory that
Heidegger presented in his letter to the French was defended by his
French students, above all by Beaufret, its original recipient. When he
wrote to Heidegger at thc close of the war, Beaufret was merely an
obscure French student of phenomcnology who had become interested
in Hcidcgger's theory that he saw to be lurking in the background of
Sartre's. Heidegger's initial praise of Beaufret who had not yet made a
name for himsetf was clcarly linked to his own desire to curry favor with
thc French, to seize the occasion that Beaufret's letter represented for
hirn, to utilize Beaufrct in his time of need. When Beaufret tater made
a name for hirnself, it was as the unconditionat defender of Heidegger's
theory that he patiently explained to the French in the course of a
dialogue with the master thinkcr extending over more than thirty years.
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The phenomenon of orthodoxy is weIl known in philosophy. It
is illustrated by the relation of the post-Kantians to Kant, each of whom
claimed to be the only one who truly understood the master's thought.
It is illustrated as weil by the relation of Marxists 'to Marx, beginningwith
Friedrich Engels, the first Marxist, who initially raised the claim alone to
understand Marx's theory. Other thinkers, including Heidegger, have had
orthodox disciples, writers who cleaved to the master's thought, who saw
lheir only task as the authentie statement of the master's ideas. Heid-
egger has created numerous disciples, in Germany Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Hermann and in the US William Richardson, writers who subordinate
their entire professional career, in effect their professional being, entirely
to the master's thought and being. But no one has ever had a more loyal,
more selfeffacing, more orthodox disciple than Beaufret who ceaselessly
sounded the call to Heidegger's thought as literally incomparable with
anything else in the philosophical tradition, as sui generis bence as
incomparable, like being itself beyond the possibility of predication.
A disciple may normally devote a couple of papers, perhaps a
volume to the rnaster's thought. Beaufret was not anormal disciple since
his attachment to Heidegger's Iife and t~oughtknew no limits. Beaufret
himself recalls that he was once the only student in one of Heidegger's
seminars3• Over the course of his lengthy dialogue with the master, he
produced no less than four volumes ofdialogues witb Heidegger, a couple
of volurnes of interviews, rnany papers, around a dozen radio talks, and
so on, all without a single critical word. He further trained an entire
generation of Frencb Heidegger students, many of whom became weil
known, such as Courtine, Marion, Janicaud, and so on. None of
Beaufret's students is quite as orthodox as he was and some have even
becorne critical of Heidegger over time. Yet by his own admiSsion, in
that time only one of his students ever rejected the view of Heidegger he
presented, only one of them ever rejected the authorized version of
Heidegger's thought. Throughout this period, Beaufret, who bad
privileged access to the master's texts, and who frequently traveled to
Freiburg to rneet with hirn, was constantly able to cite unpublished
3 Se Jean BeauCret, DiaJogue avec Heidegger. IV: Le chemin de Heidegger. (Paris:
Minuit, 1985): 21.
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documents and personal communications to bolster the authorized
version of the master's thought.
The view that Beaufret presented did not differ as much as a
comma with the view that Heidegger himself offered in the "Letter on
Humanism." This way of reading Heidegger as a nonanthropological
humanist is still largcly dominant in the French philosophical discussion.
It can be illustrated by Dcrrida's weil known article on "Les fins de
I'hommelt4 that reproduces without criticism of any kind, in thc familiar
orthodox style pionecrcd by Beaufret in France, all the main traits of
Heidegger's sclfindulgcnt rcading of his theory as a nonanthropological
humanism in the course of a violent attack on Sartre. Derrida's relation
to Heidegger's theory is a key to an understanding of his own view.
According to Derrida, although Heidegger is present in all his texts, he
always preserves a critical distance from the master. Yet Derrida mainly,
often tends to reformulate in his own language precisely that reading
transmitted everywhere in French philosophy over many years by
Beaufret's efforts.
This nonanthropologicalhumanist reading of Heidegger's theory
follows directly from Heidegger's .ILetter on Humanism" (and) has been
highly inßuential in French philosophy, above all in the effort to come to
grips with the problem posed by Heidegger's Nazi turning. Heidegger's
rise to influence in French philosophical circles depended initially on the
interpretation of his "Letter on Humanism" as indicating that his political
engagement had been brought to a close, that he had later turned away
from Nazism. The resurgence of Victor Farias' study, Heidegger el le
nazisme, (Paris: Verdier, 1987), gave rise to a violent debate. This
debate raiscd again the old problem of the link between Heidegger's
philoso-phical thought and his political engagement, Heidegger the great
philosophcr and Heidcgger the ordinary Nazi.
In vicw of Hcidegger's preeminent role in French philosophy, it
is difficult for Frcnch philosophers, who tend to equate an atlack on
Hcidcgger with an attack on Frcnch philosophy, to understand the
4 See Jacques Derrida, Marges dc la philosophie. (Paris: Minuit, 1972): 129-164.
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problem other than through the matrix of his thought. The same idea of
the turning that. forms the basis of the nonanthropological humanist
reading of Heidegger's theory is also used to save if not the theoretician
and the early theory at least the later theory. In closely related ways,
both Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe argue that aithough the early
Heidegger was led to Nazism that is metaphysical humanism through his
early theory, the later Heidegger leaves both Nazism and metaphysics
behind in his turn against philosophy. This argument leads to some of
the stranger statements of this or any time, as in Lacoue-Labarthe's claim
that "Ie nazisme est un humanisme..."s
This way of reading Heidegger's theory to save its tater phase
runs against the grain of the theory it is meant to save. The later deve-
lopment of Heidegger's theory, as he clearly insists, does not leave behind
but only deepens its original formulation. It follows that either Heideg-
ger'~ theory was and remains metaphysical, in which case we can under-
stand that he never gives up Nazism to which he turned on the basis of
a theory that only grew deeper but never broke with its original formu-
lation; or the theory never was metaphysics, the later theory is unrelated
to Nazism and the original turning to Nazism becomes incomprehensible.
This reading of Heidegger's theory that forms the main theme of
the second phase of the Freneh Heidegger reception was advanced to
correet the initial misreading of the theory. Yet the second, correeted
reading is itself a misreading, every bit as erroneous as the initial
misreading. Heidegger suggests inconsistently that humanism is meta-
physics but that his own understanding of human being through being is
a nonmetaphysical humanism. Now he cannot have it both ways; he must
choose between the claim that metaphysics is humanism and thc incom-
patible claim that his own theory is nonmetaphysical, albeit a new,
different kind of metaphysics, a metaphysics of being, as he initially
suggested in Being and Time or, on the eontrary, that his theory is
beyond philosophy, and not metaphysics, but then it is not humanism. In
either case, on the basis of his own view of humanism as outlined in the
"Letter on Humanism," it is a misreading of his theory to understand it
5 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. La fiction du poJitique. (Paris: Bourgeois, 1987): 138.
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as humanism. It further follows that the course correction in which his
theory was reinterpreted, no longer as an anthropological humanism, but
as a nonanthropological humanism is as mistaken as the original inter-
pretation. To the cxtent that this latter reading is typical of thc Frcnch
J Heidegger discussion, it finally follows that it is m'ainly based on a
misreading.
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